Although economists cite potential gains from induced innovation as an advantage of using market-based mechanisms to protect the environment, counts of patents related to flue gas desulfurization units ("scrubbers") peaked before trading of sulfur dioxide (SO 2 ) permits began. This paper uses plant level data to study the effect of these patents on pollution control. I find that requiring plants constructed before 1990 to install scrubbers created incentives for innovation that would lower the costs of operating scrubbers. There is little evidence that the new patents created before 1990 improved the ability of scrubbers to more effectively control pollution. However, patents granted during the 1990s, when market-based mechanisms were in place, do serve to improve the removal efficiency of scrubbers. Economists cite potential gains from induced innovation as one of the advantages of using market-based mechanisms over command and control (CAC) policies to protect the environment. Several theoretical papers, such as Prince (1989, 1992) and Magat (1978) have demonstrated the advantages of market-based mechanisms for inducing technological innovation. Recent empirical work, such as Popp (2001), Newell et al. (1999) , Jaffe and Palmer (1997) , and Lanjouw and Mody (1996) , demonstrates that environmental innovation does indeed respond to incentives such as prices or regulation. However, there is no empirical work containing a direct comparison of innovation between a command and control and market-based policy regime. Using data on coal-fired electric utilities from before and after passage of the 1990 Clean Air Act, this paper attempts to fill that gap.
Before the CAA of 1990, plants were required to use the best available technology for pollution control, which was often a scrubber. As a result, there were incentives for innovation that would lower the costs of installing and operating scrubbers. However, there would be little incentive for innovations to improve the efficiency of the scrubbers' ability to actually remove pollutants. Theoretical models of induced innovation and environmental policy typically do not distinguish between these two types of innovation. Matching patent data with data from the EIA on installation costs, operating costs, and removal efficiencies of the scrubbers, this paper looks for changes in the types of innovation that were taking place before and after the Clean Air Act of 1990. I show that patents granted before 1990 had no effect on removal efficiency, but did lower the operating cost of scrubbers. In contrast, patents granted during the 1990s not only lowered operating costs, but also increased the removal efficiency of scrubbers. Thus, although the level of innovation did not change upon the introduction of the market-based permit trading policy, the nature of innovation did.
Previous empirical work on pollution control technologies for coal-fired electric utilities includes Bellas (1998) and Carlson et al. (2000) . Looking at scrubbers installed by 1992, Bellas finds no significant evidence of technological change in abatement technology. In contrast, Carlson et al. find that about 20%, or $50 , of the change in marginal abatement costs that have occurred from 1985 to 1995 can be attributed to technological change. Since Bellas sample includes few scrubbers installed after passage of the 1990 CAA, and none installed after trading in SO 2 permits began, the results of these two papers are consistent with economic theory, which predicts that market based policies induce more technological change. However, the results are inconsistent with the observation that pollution control patents and R&D activity is highest during the early 1980s. One possible explanation for this discrepancy is that both papers simply use a time trend to represent technological change. The use of a time trend may not accurately reflect changes in technology, as there are variations in patenting and R&D efforts over time. By using patent data, I can more accurately model the progress of innovation that may have occurred in scrubber technology. In particular, I use the patents to observe changes in the types of research done in each policy era. Furthermore, by using data through 1997, I am able to compare changes in technological progress before and after passage of the 1990 Clean Air Act.
I. History of Environmental Regulations Facing Utilities 1
Before the 1990 Clean Air Act established the sulfur dioxide permit market, electric utilities faced command and control regulations that focused on pollution control technology.
Regulation of sulfur dioxide emissions began with the 1970 Clean Air Act, which listed SO 2 as one of six criteria pollutants. The 1970 Clean Air Act required the EPA to establish "national ambient air quality standards" (NAAQS) for such pollutants at levels that would ensure the public health and welfare. Once the NAAQS were set by the EPA, states were to develop a plan, known as a "state implementation plan" (SIP) for attaining the required standards. Although the EPA has the authority to review a state's SIP, each state was given freedom to choose how it would attain the emissions goals required by the NAAQS (Martineau et al, 1997) .
The criteria used by the EPA to evaluate SIPs were technology-based. Because Congress was concerned that retrofitting older sources of pollution would be costly, they instead instructed the EPA to require that new sources meet more stringent pollution control standards. The EPA listed 61 sources that contribute significantly to air pollution, and required these sources to satisfy "new source performance standards" (NSPS). Among these sources were fossil fuel fired steam boilers for which construction began after August 17, 1971, which were covered under NSPS Subpart D (NSPSD). NSPSD required that newly constructed utilities, or existing units undergoing modification or reconstruction, meet minimum emission standards. The standards were to be set based on the best technology that had been "adequately demonstrated." Since NSPSD was set at the national level, it was an exception to the rule that states were given freedom to implement individual SIPs. However, regulations in the SIPs that were more stringent than NSPSD took precedent, so that the national NSPSD standards can be seen as minimum standards to be met (Ellerman et al. 1997) . The Act required NSPS standards to be reviewed every four years (Brownell & Zeugin 1991) .
NSPS Subpart Da (NSPSDa) of the 1977 Clean Air Act, which covers boilers for which construction commenced after September 18, 1978, clarified the national standards for sulfur dioxide and added an additional technology requirement for electric utilities. Most importantly, the 1977 amendments required that most new coal-burning plants use flue gas desulfurization units (FGD units, or "scrubbers") to remove 90% of SO 2 emissions from their exhaust.
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The intent of the requirement was to protect the jobs of miners in states with high-sulfur coal by making it less likely that utilities would meet the Clean Air Act's emission requirements by switching to low-sulfur coal. (Brownell and Zeugin 1991) .
The 1977 amendments also added new technology-based standards. First, major new sources of pollution required "prevention of significant deterioration" (PSD) permits. The list of major new sources includes fossil-fueled fired steam electric plants or boilers totaling more than 250 million BTU/HR heat (Brownell & Zeugin 1991) . To receive a PSD permit, the applicant must show that the "best available control technology" (BACT) will be used for each pollutant emitted. Finally, the EPA set more stringent guidelines for air quality control regions that were not in attainment of the NAAQS. SIPs for nonattainment areas required permits for new or modified pollution sources. At a minimum, the permit program must require that these sources install pollution control equipment designed to achieve the "lowest achievable emission rate" (LAER). Furthermore, existing sources in nonattainment areas could be required to install "reasonably available control technology" (RACT) (Brownell & Zeugin 1991) .
Unfortunately, the concept of best available control technology was not well-defined by the EPA. The 1977 CAA stated that BACT limits would be determined on a case-by-case basis.
Determination of the BACT should consider energy, environmental, and economic impacts.
However, the relative weight assigned to each factor was to be determined by individual states.
The burden of the BACT analysis was placed on the permit applicant. To demonstrate that the chosen technology was the BACT, the applicant had to show that alternative technologies with more stringent pollution control would cause "unreasonable adverse energy, environmental, or economic impacts." (U.S. EPA 1978) For example, a slightly more stringent control technology could be ruled out if the economic or energy costs of the technology are significantly greater.
Economic impacts considered could include investment costs, operations and maintenance costs, and annualized costs of operations and maintenance plus depreciation. In addition, applicants could consider impacts on the local economy. For example, if a region suffered from high unemployment, a more stringent control technology could be ruled out if it would lead to a loss of jobs (U.S. EPA 1978).
In 1987, EPA guidelines on BACT changed to focus on the most stringent control available. The 1987 guidelines, known as "the Potter memorandum," instituted a top-down approach to BACT analysis. Applicants must begin by determining the most stringent control technology available. That technology could only be ruled out if it can be shown to be technically or economically infeasible. If it was ruled out, the applicant was to proceed to the next most stringent control technology, and so on, until a technology that could not be ruled out is found (Brownell & Zeugin 1991) . The top-down approach made the BACT requirement similar to the "lowest achievable emission rate" (LAER) requirements for new sources in nonattainment areas. A LAER technology must be at least as stringent as any technology in use in any state. The costs of such technology could be considered, but only if the costs were so high that they would prohibit the new source from operating at all (Brownell & Zeugin, 19991) .
The 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act (1990 CAA) changed the regulation of electric utilities' SO 2 emissions from a command and control approach to a market-based approach. It also changed the focus from state-based implementation plans to one aggregate national emissions limit to be met. The 1990 amendments repealed the requirement that 90% of SO 2 emissions at coal-burning plants be scrubbed. Instead, Title IV of the 1990 CAA introduced tradable SO 2 emissions allowances. Starting in 1995, Phase I utilities 3 were required to have permits for each ton of SO 2 emitted. In Phase I, allowances were allocated to allow each affected utility to emit 2.5 lbs/mmBtu per year. Firms that were not able to meet this requirement could emit more if they purchased additional permits from a plant that was able to reduce emissions by more than the required amount. Total allowances equaled 8.7 million tons.
For comparison, these plants emitted 9.3 tons of SO 2 in 1985 (Ellerman et al., 1997) . Firms could receive additional allowances if they installed "qualifying control technologies" that reduce a plant's SO 2 emissions by at least 90 percent. (Martineau & Novello 1997) 3 Phase I utilities include the 263 dirtiest utilities, based on 1985 emissions levels.
Because plants were no longer required to install scrubbers, they could choose the most cost effective methods to reduce emissions. Ellerman et al. (1997) (Ellerman et al. 1997) .
II. Innovation levels before and after the 1990 CAA
A large body of environmental economic literature has demonstrated the benefits that market-based mechanisms have for inducing research and development (R&D) on environmentally friendly technologies. These models universally predict that market based environmental policies will induce more innovation than command and control policies.
However, each of these papers focuses only on the overall level of innovation.
In this paper, I use patent data to look for changes in the nature of the R&D performed.
Even though the best available control technology policy of NSPSD and NSPSDa provides no incentives for firms to develop scrubbers that exceed the removal efficiency requirements, there were incentives to perform research designed to reduce the costs of these scrubbers.
Cost-reducing innovations would still be beneficial in a permit trading market. Permit markets work by taking advantage of differences in marginal abatement costs across firms.
Thus, firms that could lower their marginal abatement costs would benefit by being able to sell pollution allowances to firms with higher marginal abatement costs. However, firms could also have additional permits to sell if they used pollution abatement technology that removed more pollution. Thus, there are incentives for innovation to increase the removal efficiency of scrubbers in the market-based policy regime. This additional incentive suggests the following two hypotheses to be tested in the empirical work that follows: 1) Innovation under the command and control regime should have focused on lowering costs, rather than increasing efficiency.
2) Innovation after passage of the 1990 CAA may focus on either lowering operating costs or increasing removal efficiency.
I begin by looking at the level of innovative activity in sulfur dioxide pollution control.
To measure the level of innovative activity, I use U.S. patents related to sulfur dioxide pollution control. To identify such patents, I use the classification and subclassification assigned to each patent by the U.S. Patent Office. These classifications describe the type of invention represented by the patent. I began by identifying classifications that were related to SO 2 pollution control.
These are shown in Table 2 . Then, using data available on Lexis/Nexis, I identified all patents in these classifications from 1900 to 1997. In addition, using data from a set of CD-ROMs produced by MicroPatent, I obtained additional details on pollution control patents granted since 1975, including the application date and country of origin.
The use of patent data to measure innovative activity offers several advantages. The biggest advantage of patent data is that, unlike other data on inventive activity, such as R&D expenditures, patent data is available in highly disaggregated forms. General data on air pollution expenditures in the U.S. are available since 1972. However, it is not possible to tell how much of this R&D effort went towards SO 2 pollution control. Furthermore, using patent data allows me to construct a longer time series, as historical patent data is available since 1793.
Nonetheless, when working with patent data, it is important to be aware of its limitations.
The existing literature on the benefits and drawbacks of using patent data is quite large.
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An important concern is that the quality of individual patents varies widely. Some inventions are extremely valuable, whereas others are of almost no commercial value. This is partly a result of the random nature of the inventive process. Accordingly, the results of this paper are best interpreted as the effect of an "average" patent, rather than any specific invention.
Another potential pitfall is that the propensity to patent new inventions may have changed over time. If this is the case, using patents rather than R&D to measure innovative activity misstates the returns to R&D. Historically, the ratio of patents to R&D expenditures has fallen in the United States (as well as in other industrialized nations). Some researchers, most notably Evenson (1991) , consider the falling ratio to be evidence of diminishing returns to R&D. 6 The intuition is that, as researchers continue to search for new ideas, it gets harder and harder to find something yet to be discovered. Similarly, Kortum and Lerner (1998) argue that a recent upswing in patenting activity in the United States is due to the increasing fertility of new research opportunities. Other researchers, most notably Griliches (1989) , claim that research opportunities have not declined. Griliches argues that the fall in the patent-to-R&D ratio is due to changes in the willingness of inventors to patent new inventions. An exogenous fall in the willingness to patent -caused, for example by changes in patent laws that affect the benefits of holding a patent -would result in a falling patent-to-R&D ratio even if the productivity of research spending remained the same.
Acknowledging these concerns, a first look at the data suggests that the 1990 CAA had little effect on innovative activity. Figure 1 shows an index of the percentage of successful patent applications related to SO 2 control per year, as well as an index of air pollution R&D expenditures, taken from the U.S Department of Commerce (1994) . Only patents granted to U.S. applicants are considered, as these would be the inventors most influenced by changes in American environmental regulations. Application data is available for patents granted since 1975. Patents are sorted by their year of application because several researchers have found that patent applications are highly correlated with levels of R&D expenditures. Thus, the year of the patent application is a good proxy for when the R&D occurred (Griliches 1990 ). Since a patent application is only made public when a patent is granted, the data have been scaled up to account for patents applied for but not yet granted.
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I use a percentage of successful applications, rather than a raw count, to adjust for changes in patenting activity due to growth in the economy and changes in the propensity of inventors to file for patent protection.
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Note that both general air pollution R&D expenditures and SO 2 pollution control patents fall over time. In addition, there is no upswing in innovative activity after passage of the Clean Air Act in 1990. 9 diminishing returns. Diminishing returns to research simply implies that it becomes more and more difficult to develop new inventions as time progresses. 7 To scale the data, I first find the distribution of the lag between application and grant for all patents granted in the U.S. Using this distribution, the percentage of patents remaining to be granted after 1997 was calculated for each application year and added to the data.
III. Did Pollution Control Innovations Control Pollution?
The patent data presents a puzzle. Although economic theory predicts that market-based environmental policies should induce innovation, there is less innovation on scrubbers after the 1990 CAA. It is possible that there are other mitigating factors that discouraged R&D. For example, permit prices were lower than initially predicted. Early predictions were that permits would sell for $250-$350 per ton during Phase I, and over $500 per ton during Phase II.
However, actual prices fell quickly, approaching, and sometimes even falling below, $100 per ton (Joskow et al. 1998) . Since one of the benefits of developing a more efficient pollution control technology is that it enables plants to sell permits to other plants with less effective technology, decreases in the price of pollution permits would lower the incentive to do R&D.
More importantly, the 1990 CAA allowed utilities more flexibility to control SO 2 emissions. Other researchers have noted that, as a result of falling prices, many utilities shifted to low sulfur coal during the early 1990's.
In this section, I test the hypothesis that incentives for the type of innovation changed after passage of the 1990 CAA. I ask whether the innovations that occurred in scrubber technology had an effect on the removal efficiency of the scrubbers -that is, did the innovations actually help to improve pollution control. I also check to see whether this effect is constant over For each of these units, the data set contains, among other things, the year the scrubber went on line, the removal efficiency of the scrubber, the operating and maintenance costs of the scrubber, and the costs of installing the scrubber. Of these, scrubbers with efficiency ratings less than or equal to 50 percent were removed from the data set, as such scrubbers, which were still being installed as late as 1994, do not represent the latest in technological advances. Also, to insure that the data on pollution control regulations from Form 767 is consistent with the regulations faced by the plants when the scrubber was installed, I delete observations for which the current regulations took affect more than three years after the scrubber went online.
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This leaves 180 FGD units for analysis. 14 NSPSD and NSPSDa are dummy variables equal to one if the plant is covered by each of these federal regulatory regimes. CAA90 is a dummy variable equal to one for plants that went on-line in the 1990s.
The no policy dummy covers those plants for which construction commenced before August 17, 1971 , and are thus not affected by any of these three federal clean air policy regimes.
In addition, Figure 2 plots the average removal efficiency of new scrubbers per year, as well as a three-year moving average. The figure is divided into three policy regimes, corresponding with the 1970 CAA, the 1977 CAA, and the 1990 CAA. Note that the average removal efficiency rises during the NSPSD period before leveling off during NSPSDa. This is the period in which newly constructed coal-fired plants were required to install FGD units with 90% removal efficiency ratings.
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During the NSPSDa period, there was little incentive to install a scrubber with a removal efficiency rating exceeding 90%. However, the average once again increases after passage of the 1990 CAA. Particularly striking is that the moving average in the NSPSDa era is nearly flat. One the desired removal efficiency is met, there is little incentive for 12 I assume that plants that brought scrubbers online within three years of when the regulations took affect could have been anticipating the regulatory changes that took place. 13 Data on the price of low-sulfur coal is an average of the delivered price of low-sulfur coal per year, taken from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's Form 423, Monthly Cost and Quality of Fuels for Electric Plants. Prices are in 1982 dollars, and are deflated using the producer price index for electric power. 14 In the data sample, states imposed 63% of regulations, the federal government imposed 32%, and local governments imposed 5%. plants to exceed the standard. In contrast, the moving average steadily increases after passage of the 1990 CAA, suggesting that technological innovation plays an important role in this era. Of the 16 plants that installed scrubbers with removal efficiency ratings below 90%, 14 had SO 2 emission rates less than 0.6 lbs per million Btu heat input, and thus only required to install scrubbers with 70% removal efficiency ratings. Only 2 plants appear to be in violation of the NSPSDa requirements. Converesely, during the CAA90 era, 73% of scrubbers installed achieved removal efficiencies of at least 95%.
My goal is to see how the knowledge embodied in SO 2 pollution control patents affected the removal efficiency of scrubbers. For this, I first construct a stock of pollution control knowledge. I begin with a count of all patents related to SO 2 pollution control from 1900 to 1997. To construct the stock of knowledge, I use a rate of decay, represented by β 1 , to capture the obsolescence of older patents. Over time, the knowledge embodied in a patent becomes obsolete, as new and better inventions take its place. In addition, it takes time for the knowledge embodied in a new patent to spread throughout the economy. A new patent represents invention, the first step in technological change. Before it can have an effect on the economy, the new 15 Because some plants received exceptions for having SO 2 emissions rates below 0.6 lbs/million Btus of heat input, and because construction on some plants going online during this period commenced before the NSPSDa starting invention represented by a patent must be developed for commercial use. This stage of development is known as innovation. By measuring the effect of knowledge on removal efficiency, I am measuring the results of this commercialization, rather than simply the benefits of discovery of the new invention. Thus, the stock of knowledge also includes a rate of diffusion, β 2 , to capture delays in the flow of knowledge. Defining s as the number of years before the current year, the stock of knowledge at time t is written as:
(1)
The rate of diffusion is multiplied by s+1 so that diffusion is not constrained to be zero in the current period. To test whether there is a change in the type of research done after passage of the 1990 CAA, I also create a second knowledge stock that includes only patents granted in or after To illustrate the effect of various rates of decay and diffusion, Figure 3 shows the weight placed on each patent x years after its grant date. The decay rate is constant across each row, and the rate of diffusion is constant down each column. Note that patents have a more immediate impact when the rates of decay and diffusion are high. 
For each observation, I use the predicted value of knowledge for the year in which the scrubber was installed. 16 The dummy variables represent the four regimes in Table 3 , plus an additional dummy for plants covered by NSPSDa that only need to install a scrubber with 70% removal efficiency. The excluded dummy variable in the regressions is CAA90. 17 Because each type of limit is only in force for a subset of the plants, for each regulation type I also include for dummy variables equal to one when a plant is affected by the regulation.
To estimate the model, I first create a predicted knowledge stock for a given value of β 1 and β 2 . Once the knowledge stock has been created, equation (3) is linear in parameters.
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The results are corrected for autocorrelation.
20 Table 5 presents results of the regression for a decay rate of 0.1 and a rate of diffusion of 0.25.
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As expected, variables affecting low sulfur coal, which can serve as a substitute for scrubbing, have positive effects. More efficient scrubbers are installed when the price of low sulfur coal is high, or when the design specifications of the scrubber call for greater sulfur content in the coal. Plants facing regulations on the sulfur content of coal also install more efficient scrubbers.
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In addition, the presence of additional SO 2 emissions limits leads to the installation of more efficient scrubbers, but efficiency does not increase as the magnitude of the regulation increases. Similarly, minimum efficiency standards for scrubbers also lead to less efficient removal efficiencies, suggesting that these regulations do not keep up with changing technology -even though more efficient scrubbers are available, utilities choose not to install 18 I regress the knowledge stock on a constant, two dummy variables stating whether NSPSD or NSPSDa are in effect, the real price of low sulfur coal, current and lagged prices of SO 2 permits, and a time trend. For the post-90 knowledge stock, the NSPSD and NSPSDa dummy variables are omitted. 19 It is possible to estimate the rates of decay and diffusion by performing this estimation for a range of β 1 and β 2 and minimizing a generalized method of moments (GMM) criterion. For this example, the optimal decay rate is 0.49, and the optimal rate of diffusion is 0.32. Unfortunately, this estimation strategy suffers from two drawbacks. First, the minimization assumes that the effect of knowledge is accurately captured by changes in removal efficiency, rather than by other variables. As the following results show, this is not the case. Second, the resulting standard errors are unreliable. Computing the standard errors from the GMM estimation requires a derivative of the error term with respect to each of the parameters of the model. If β 1 and β 2 are treated as endogenous parameters to be estimated, the matrix needed to compute the covariance matrix is highly collinear and cannot be inverted. As a result, the standard errors presented in the paper do not account for the randomness of the rates of decay and diffusion, and thus should be treated as upper bounds. 20 Correcting for autocorrelation should help to address changes that occur in the propensity to patent over time. For example, if the falling patent-R&D ratio is due to a decrease in the propensity to patent, newer patents should be more valuable, as they represent more R&D effort. Thus, the error associated with knowledge should increase over time. In fact, the results suggest that this is not a concern, as the Durbin-Watson statistic for the regression is 1.90. 21 These rates are consistent with others used in the R&D literature. For example, discussing the literature on an appropriate lag structure for R&D capital, Griliches (1995) notes that previous studies suggest a structure peaking between three and five years. The rates of decay and diffusion used in this paper provide a lag peaking after four years. 22 To evaluate the effects of the policy variables, it is necessary to look at both the dummy variables and slope coefficients. I evaluate the slope coefficients at the mean levels for the variables. more efficient scrubbers because such scrubbers are not necessary to comply with the regulations they face. Also, note that each of the pre-CAA90 policy regimes led to the installation of less efficient scrubbers. For example, controlling for other factors, scrubbers installed by plants under NSPSDa were 2.8% less efficient than scrubbers installed in the CAA90 era, and plants that only faced the 70% removal efficiency requirement installed scrubbers that were an additional 1.8% less efficient. In each case, the effect is statistically significant.
My particular interest is to observe the effect of the knowledge stock on removal efficiency. As expected, before the CAA90 policy era, knowledge had no effect on removal efficiency. The coefficient is just 0.001, and is statistically insignificant. However, patents granted in or after 1990 do have a significant effect on removal efficiency. Also, as Table 6 shows, this result does not change much as the rates of decay and diffusion are allowed to vary.
For any given decay rate, higher rates of diffusion lower the magnitudes of the coefficients. For any given rate of diffusion, the coefficients, as well as the impact of each patent, increase as the decay rate increases. However, as we will see below, the magnitude of the effect depends not just on the coefficients on knowledge, but also on the rates of decay and diffusion assumed.
To more clearly illustrate the magnitude of the effect of new knowledge, Table 7 shows the effect of a new patent on removal efficiency, using the ten percent decay rate and 25 percent rate of diffusion. The marginal effect of a new patent is simply the knowledge coefficient from equation (3), multiplied by the appropriate rate of decay and diffusion. The table shows the impact of a patent four years after it is granted, since, for the rates of decay and diffusion used, that is the year in which a patent has its maximum impact. The table is divided into three periods, representing the three Clean Air Acts.
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As noted before, a new patent granted from the two command and control eras has almost no effect on removal efficiency, increasing it by just 0.0003% after four years. However, the effect of patents granted in the 1990s is significant. A new patent from the SO 2 permit trading era increases removal efficiency by 0.024% after four years. To understand the full magnitude of the knowledge created in each era, the last column of Table 7 multiplies the gain per patent by the average number of patents granted per year in each era. During the CCAA90 regime, the knowledge created each year increased removal efficiency by 1.58%.
Although choosing rates of decay and diffusion so that the value of a patent peaks after four years is consistent with other findings in the R&D literature, a potential concern is that such rates are inappropriate here. Since there were little policy incentives to install higher efficiency scrubbers during the NSPSD and NSPSDa eras, it is possible that the inventions completed during that time would have increased removal efficiency, but simply weren't installed because they weren't needed -that is, these new innovations simply hadn't diffused yet. To check this, Table 8 repeats the results of Table 7 for a decay rate of 0.05 and a rate of diffusion of 0.01. By using slower rates of decay and diffusion, a new patent would have its greatest impact 17 years after its initial grant. Thus, patents from the late 1970s, when scrubber patenting activity peaked, would have a maximum effect in the mid 1990s, when permit trading began. Even when the knowledge stock weights are changed so that patents from the 1970s have their greatest impact in the 1990s, these patents have almost no effect on removal efficiency. In addition, the patents from the 1990s still do have a significant effect, even though, using the lower rates of decay and diffusion, they have not yet had the chance to diffuse completely. 23 Because the patent data is sorted by year of grant, and it takes, on average, two years for a patent application to be granted, the starting date for patents from each era is two years after passage of the respective Clean Air Act, so that Finally, Table 9 shows how the value of a post-1990 patent varies as the rates of decay and diffusion vary. To allow for variations in the diffusion of knowledge, panel A presents efficiency gains one year after a patent is granted, and panel B presents efficiency gains that occur four years after the patent is granted.
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Although the estimated coefficients fall as diffusion rates increase, the increases in removal efficiency, while still small, are higher with larger rates of diffusion, as the knowledge embodied in each patent is transmitted more quickly.
IV. Did Pollution Control Innovations Lower Costs?
Although regulations requiring the installation of scrubbers do not provide incentives to increase the removal efficiency of scrubbers, they do provide incentives for innovation that lowers costs. By lowering the cost of utilizing the best available control technology, such innovation would lower the cost of compliance with BACT regulations without adversely affecting future regulatory burdens placed on the firm.
To test the hypothesis that scrubber innovations before 1990 lowered the costs of operating scrubbers, I once again use data from the Steam-Electric Plant Operation and Design
Report . In addition to the variables used in the previous section, this report contains detailed information on the operating costs of FGD units, as well as characteristics of the units that may affect the costs of operation. 25 Operating and maintenance costs are in 1982 dollars, and deflated using the producer price index for electric utilities. 26 The choice of variables concerning scrubber characteristics follows Bellas (1998) .
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Constructing the stocks of knowledge in the same way as in section IV, I regress the real operating and maintenance (O&M) costs of scrubber units on characteristics of the scrubbers.
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Because knowledge will be correlated with the various characteristics of the scrubbers, I once again use an instrumental variables approach, regressing the knowledge stock on policy and price variables that influence the evolution of technology.
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These results give me predicted values for the knowledge stock for each year from 1972-1997, which I use as an independent variable in the O&M cost regressions. Proceeding as before, I first present results using a decay rate (β 1 ) of 0.1, and a rate of diffusion (β 2 ) equal to 0.25. 
Because the key variables of interest do not vary over time, I use a random effects specification of the error term, so that w i,t = ε i,t + u i . Table 11 presents the regression results. Note that the knowledge stock has a significant negative effect on operating costs in all eras, and the effect is somewhat larger during the 1990s.
27 Similar results are obtained using the capital cost of scrubbers, except that the magnitude of the savings before CAA90 is smaller, suggesting that plants were willing to accept larger upfront capital costs in exchange for lower O&M costs. However, the capital expenditure data is not available for every unit, and is less reliable due to reporting differences across plants. Thus, I only report the results for O&M costs in the paper. 28 I regress the knowledge stock on a constant, two dummy variables stating whether NSPSD or NSPSDa are in effect, the real price of low sulfur coal, current and lagged prices of SO 2 permits, and a time trend. 29 Autocorrelation does not appear to be a problem, as the Durbin-Watson statistic is 1.9.
The signs of other variables are as expected.
30 Table 12 presents sensitivity analysis of the knowledge coefficients to the rates of decay and diffusion. For any given decay rate, the coefficients fall as diffusion increases, and for any given rate of diffusion, the coefficients rise as the decay rate rises. Also, for low decay rates, knowledge has less impact on operating costs after passage of the 1990 Clean Air Act. Table 13 presents the average operating cost savings resulting from a new pre-1990
patent. As before, panel A presents savings after one year, and panel B presents savings after four years. For the ten percent decay rate and 25 percent diffusion rate, the average patent saves a firm $4,077 after four years. This figure rises to $6,445 for patents granted in the 1990s. For comparison, average O&M costs throughout the sample period are $3.05 million per year. In general, the savings occurring after one year increase as the rate of diffusion increases.
However, for the highest rates of diffusion, the impact of knowledge is almost immediate, so the highest savings after four years are for patents with mid-range rates of decay and diffusion.
To put these numbers into perspective, it is interesting to consider the social value of a new patent, in terms of O&M cost savings. If we assume a 30 year lifespan for a new FGD unit and a 7% discount rate, the present value of cost savings from a new pre-1990 patent over the life of the unit is $34,883. There are 174 firms included in the regression sample. If each firm, on average, experiences these savings, the present value of total savings for the industry are $6.07 million. For comparison, about $1.5 million of R&D are spent for each patent granted in 30 I interact the age of the unit and the percent of time the FGD is in service because I assume these two variables are related, as older units are more likely to break down. Without this interaction, the effect of age on operating costs is positive, which would imply that individual units become cheaper to run as they age.
the United States.
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Thus, as would be expected, given the positive externalities that result from research and development, the social returns to these patents are quite high.
V. Conclusions
This paper began with a puzzle: despite theoretical evidence that market-based environmental policies should increase innovation, the number of patents related to sulfur dioxide pollution control fell after passage of the 1990 Clean Air Act, which instituted a market for tradable SO 2 permits. By combining data on flue gas desulfurization units with this patent data, I find that, although the level of innovative activity fell after passage of the 1990 Clean Air Act, the nature of innovative activity changed. Prior to 1990, most new plants were required to install a scrubber with a 90% removal efficiency rating. As a result, there were no incentives for R&D that would increase the ability of scrubbers to control pollution. However, there were incentives to perform R&D to lower the costs of operating these scrubbers, and thus lower the costs of complying with the regulation. In contrast, the SO 2 permit market established by the 1990 Clean Air Act provided incentives to install scrubbers with higher removal efficiencies, and thus led to more R&D designed to improve the removal efficiency of scrubbers.
Analysis of the results suggests a couple of key points. First, it is important to note that command and control regulations do provide incentives for R&D. However, the nature of the R&D changes. In particular, the research preformed under the command and control regime did not result in a cleaner environment, but just in lower compliance costs for utilities. Although these lower costs are clearly valuable, unless the cost savings are passed on to consumers in the form of lower rates for electricity, these are rents captured by the firms.
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In comparison, the benefits of cleaner air resulting from more efficient scrubbers affect society as a whole. Second, the results raise the question of whether the resources devoted to such R&D could have been put to more productive uses. That is, do command and control policies not only not encourage productive R&D, but also lead to wasteful R&D spending to avoid the costs of regulation?
Finally, the results show that trends in patent or R&D data are not sufficient to monitor microlevel trends in innovative activity. Information on the uses of new innovations is also important.
In particular, although the level of innovative activity related to scrubbers did not increase after passage of the 1990 Clean Air Act, the types of innovative activity did change, so that innovation after institution of market-based policies was more beneficial to the environment. 32 Whether the rents are captured by the utilities themselves or the firms that produce the scrubbers depends on how much market power the producers of new scrubbers have. 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Year Pollution Control R&D Expenditures % SO2 Patents * --The effect of a new patent is the increase in removal efficiency generated by a new SO2 pollution control patent. To allow for diffusion of the innovation, this effect is calculated seventeen years after the grant of the patent. 
